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Abstract
The role of banks is integral to the economic development of any country. Given the renewed 
attention on the corporate governance in banks with the global financial crises, this paper 
investigates the relevance of board size, board composition and CEO qualities in the banks and 
their performance. Thus, the following paragraphs will elaborate on the development of 
hypotheses to test whether good corporate governance system can contribute towards higher 
banks performance. This research is different from other studies, both practical and theoretical, 
as the object of study is commercial banks in developing country. 
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Theoretical Background
Every company has a corporate governance (Steger & Amann, 2008, p.3). Academic 
interest about corporate governance issues arises after publishing a pathbreaking book 
about separation of control and ownership in the corporations, wrote by Berle and Means.
They showed that shareholder dispersion creates substantial managerial discretion, which 
can be abused. This was the starting point for the subsequent academic thinking on 
corporate governance (Tirole, 2006, p.15). However, if management was the focal point 
for the 20th century, corporate governance is set to be the primary focus for the 21st 
(Tricker, 2012).The term corporate governance derives from an analogy between the 
government of cities, nations or states and the governance of corporations (Becht, Bolton, 
Röell, 2005, p.2). Word governance is ancient, and comes from the Greek word for 
steering (Carrol & Bucholtz, 2009, p.123) but the phrase corporate governance is young.
In wave of the recent corporate scandals, corporate governance practices have received 
tremendous attention from all interest group inside and outside from corporations.
Increased media coverage has turned transparency, managerial accountability, corporate 
governance failures, weak boards of directors, hostile takeovers, protection of minority 
shareholders, and investor activism into household phrases (Tirole, 2006, p.15). The 
governance of the corporation is now as important in the world economy as the 
government of countries (Wolfensohn, 1999, p.38). Good corporate governance from the 
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comply with applicable laws and regulations while protecting the interests of depositors 
(Wilson, 2006). The efforts for establishing good corporate governance system in banks 
can be explained only with higher performance (Tandelilin, Kaaro, Mahadwartha and 
Supriyatna, 2007). Fine governance is an essential standard for establishing the striking 
investment environment which is needed by competitive companies to gain strong position 
in efficient financial markets. That is fundamental to the economies with extensive 
business background and also facilitates the success for entrepreneurship (Khan, 2011, 
p.1). In particular, the countries that have implemented sound corporate governance 
practices generally experienced a vigorous growth of corporate sector, and grasp more 
ability in attracting capital to lubricate the economy (Sheikh & Wang, 2012). McKinsey 
Quarterly surveys suggest that institutional investors will pay as much as 28% more for the 
shares of well governed companies in emerging markets (Thomsen, 2000). Many scholars 
until now examined relationship between corporate governance and company performance 
from different perspectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; John & Senbet, 1998; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; Fosberg & Nelson, 1999; Hermalin &
Weisbach, 2003; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Gillan, Hartzell and Starks, 2003; 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmerman, 2003; Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmerman, 2004;
Mak & Kusnadi, 2004; Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006; Lin & Lee, 2008; Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrel, 2009; Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok, 2010; Braga-Alves & Shastri, 2011; Afsham, 
Chetri and Pradhan, 2011; Iqbal & Zaheer, 2011; Htay, Aung, Rashid and Adnan, 2012). 
Hence, previous studies in this field were serious basis for proper shaping of this empirical 
research in macedonian banks.
Before assessing the role of banks in corporate governance, we must first define what we 
mean by this term. The Cadbury Committee define the corporate governance as the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992, p.15). Yet, while 
shareholders delegate substantial powers to management, they need assurance that power 
will not be abused. How do shareholders know that the assets they own are not being 
mismanaged, or even embezzled? (Monks & Minow, 2004, p.196). One of the most 
exploited definition about corporate governance written by Shleifer and Visny in 1997 give 
answer on question about shareholders security. They define corporate governance in terms 
of financial interests of investors. In particular, they refer to corporate governance as 
dealing in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment (Shleifer & Visny, 1997, p.737). Corporate governance can be 
considered as an environment of trust, ethics, moral values and confidence – as a synergic 
effort of all the constituents of society (Crowther & Aras, 2009). Our integral definition 
considers the corporate governance as a system which ensures that a company is run in the 
best strategic direction for all stakeholders.
Corporate Governance in the banking system has assumed heightened importance and has 
become an issue of global concern because it is required to lead to enhanced services and 
deepening of financial intermediation on the part of the banks and enables proper 
management of the operations of banks. To ensure this, both the board and management
have key roles to play to ensure the institution of corporate governance (Nworji, Adebayo 
and David, 2011). Although, the banking sector serves as the nerve centre or brain of any 
modern economy, being the repository of people’s wealth and supplier of credits which 
lubricates the engine of growth of the entire economic system (Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo 
and Park, 1993; Nworji, Adebayo and David, 2011; Jimoh & Iyoha, 2012). The banking 
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interests of other stakeholders appear more important to it than in the case of non-banking 
and non-finance organizations. In the case of traditional manufacturing corporations, the 
issue has been that of safeguarding and maximizing the shareholders’ value. In the case of 
banking, the risk involved for depositors and the possibility of contagion assumes greater 
importance than that of consumers of manufactured products. Banks due atypical 
contractual relationship, in their corporate governance model should include the depositors 
and shareholders (Macey & O’hara, 2003). Further, the involvement of government is 
discernibly higher in banks due to importance of stability of financial system and the larger 
interests of the public (Leeladhar, 2004, p.1102). Stability of banks as a dominant figure in 
whole financial systems contribute for good functioning of national economy  and 
promotes economic growth (Hermes, 1994; Levine, 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Beck, 
Levine and Loayza, 2000; Wurgler, 2000; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, 2005; Caprio, 
Laeven and Levine, 2007; Nworji, Adebayo and David, 2011). Good corporate governance 
plays a vital role in underpinning the integrity and efficiency of financial markets 
(Ghillyer, 2012, p.88). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) placed 
emphasis on establishing and improving the corporate governance of financial entities, as 
well as compliance with supervisory standards. According to BCBS (2005), corporate 
governance for banking organizations is arguably of greater importance than for other 
companies, given the crucial financial intermediation role of banks in an economy.
From a banking industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in which 
the business and affairs of banks are governed by their boards of directors and senior 
management (Huq & Bhuiyan, 2011). Board of directors is elected by the shareholders as 
the ultimate decision-making body of the company which has the responsibility of 
formulating bank loan (Sumner & Webb, 2005). A higher cost of capital will hamper and 
hurt economic development.The governance of banking companies may be different from 
that of unregulated, nonfinancial companies for several reasons. For one, the number of 
parties with a stake in an institution’s activity complicates the governance of financial 
institutions. In addition to investors, depositors and regulators have a direct interest in bank 
performance. On a more aggregate level, regulators are concerned with the effect 
governance has on the performance of financial institutions because the health of the 
overall economy depends upon their performance (Adams & Mehran, 2003, p.124).
The corporate governance of banks in developing economies is important for several 
reasons. First, banks have an overwhelmingly dominant position in developing-economy 
financial systems, and are extremely important engines of economic growth (King & 
Levine 1993 cited in Arun & Turner, 2004; Levine 1997 cited in Arun & Turner, 2004). 
Second, as financial markets are usually underdeveloped, banks in developing economies 
are typically the most important source of finance for the majority of companies. Third, as 
well as providing a generally accepted means of payment, banks in developing countries 
are usually the main depository for the economy’s savings. Fourth, many developing 
economies have recently liberalised their banking systems through 
privatisation/disinvestments and reducing the role of economic regulation. Consequently, 
managers of banks in these economies have obtained greater freedom in how they run their 
banks (Arun & Turner, 2004, p.3; Huq & Bhuiyan, 2011). Liberalization of financial 
system through privatization, the reduction of the role of regulating agencies, mergers and 
acquisitions have resulted in private and foreign control at the expense of governments and 
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decision-making freedom (Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell, 2005). Finally, 
confirm for importance of corporate governance for banks in developing countries is a 
statement of Managing Director of Croatian Banking Association Zoran Bohacek, who say 
that is not a question of whether we need corporate governance, but how to do it and 
survive.
Legal Framework
Corporate governance of Macedonian banks is a crucial item which is worth considering
with great importance by the economists nowadays, as the banks are firm foundation of the 
economy of a country. This notation emphasizes the importance of good corporate 
governance which can be achieved with a stable law regulating this subject. 
Historically, the basics of the corporate governance of the banks in the Republic of 
Macedonia are integral part of the Law of Banks and Savings-Banks, 1993. This Law does 
not clearly define the responsibilities of the Managing board and Executive committee 
which encouraged confusion and institutional instability. Taking into account the flaws of 
the above mentioned Law, the Law of Banks was established in the year 2000. Article 54 
of this Law, states that the governing bodies of a bank are the following: stockholders, 
Managing board, Executive committee, Risk Management board, Audit board as well as 
other authorities established by the statute. In this case, the supervision of the activities 
taken by the bank is performed by the Managing board which is in charge of carrying out 
the same activities. Finally, the recently used law concerning the establishment, 
management, supervision, financial activities is the Law of Banks enacted 2007. The 
previously mentioned Law (Article 82) supports the two-tier board model consisted of 
stockholders, Supervisory board, Managing board, Risk management board, Audit boards 
as well as other authorities established by the statute. According to this Law (Article 88), 
the Supervisory board is consisted of at least 5, but not more than 9 members; (Article 92) 
the Managing board is consisted of at least 2, but not more than 7 members. Unlike the 
previously mentioned Laws, this act makes clear distinction between the responsibilities of 
the boards. 
With regard to the Law of Banks as a lex specialis, there are few more laws that need to be 
considered when regulating the activities of the banks. The Code of Corporate governance 
whose foundations where laid in 2003. Banks, as joint-stock companies, have Code of 
Corporate governance different than the others companies (Drakulevski & Miladinova, 
2010). One of the important laws is the Law on Obligations enacted in 2001 which 
concerns the relation between the bank and third parties. Additionally, the Law on 
Securities, 2005, is applied for regulation of the methods and conditions for the issuance 
and trading of securities; the manner and the conditions for the functioning of the securities 
market and authorized market participants, disclosure obligations of joint stock companies 
with special reporting obligations; members of management, directors and individual 
shareholders; prohibited acts in connection with the operation of securities etc. Moreover, 
the Law of Shareholding Companies’ Takeover in 2002, concerns the manner and 
conditions for purchase of securities of the joint-stock company - issuer of securities in the
official stock exchange markets. Of a great importance is the Manual on Corporate 
Governance of the Shareholding Companies in Macedonia, 2008, as well as the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, especially useful for the banks that have super 
5listing. Other guidelines for corporate governance used by the banking sector in Macedonia 
are: White Paper on Corporate Governance in South East Europe, 2003; Developing 
Corporate Governance Codes of Best Practices, 2005; The EU Approach to Corporate 
Governance, 2008; The International Accounting Standards; Basel standards set 
recommendations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to bank 
regulators, which defines the minimum standards that need to be implemented by the banks
for risk management, and so on. 
Brief Overview of the Banking Sector in Macedonia
Macedonia has inherited the banking system from former Yugoslavia in ownership of the 
country and with a structure in correlation with the prevailing planed economy. However, 
the reconstruction of the banking system started relatively late, in 1995, writing-off the old 
foreign currency saving, assets and liabilities in terms of foreign loans and sanction of the 
biggest Macedonian Bank. In the process of economic transition, Macedonian banks 
experienced a number of reorganizations such as forced mergers, bail-outs, and changes in 
management. However, the heart of Macedonian economy is still the commercial banks.
In 2011, the activities of the banks continued to grow, although at a slower pace compared 
to the previous year, as reflected positively to the further increase of the degree of financial 
intermediation in the country. The growth of the deposits noticed a slowdown, which 
generally corresponds to the slowdown of the economic growth in this period. What is 
more, the economic entities continued to save more in local currency. As well as that, 
Macedonian banking system has stable and high solvency and capitalization, which is 
further improved during 2011. Macedonian banks has not been in a need of state financial 
support in the past few years and hence there was no formal or informal state capital 
intervention in the domestic banking sector (NBRM, 2012).
At the end of 2011, the banking system in Macedonia consisted of seventeen banks and 
eight savings banks. For analytical purposes, the National Bank (NBRM) groups the banks 
into three groups, according to the size of their assets: small, medium and large banks.
Banking network is spread over almost all cities in the country and consists of 413 
business units (which includes the headquarters of banks). But the main concentration of 
the network remained in the capital city. Compared with the previous year, the number of
the business units fell by twenty-three. In the banking sector the downward trend of the 
number of employees continued. In 2011, the number of employees in banks fell by 41. 
Additionally, continued the trend of quality improvement of the qualification structure of 
the employees in the banking system (NBRM, 2012).
According to the legal acts, each bank in Macedonia has established its own system of 
corporate governance compatible with the nature and scope of activities performed. The 
four most important banks’ authorities have a total of 304 members, representing 5.1% 
compared with the total number of employees in the banks at the end of 2011. 
Nevertheless, most of these people are members of the Supervisory board (102 members). 
Given the statutory requirement that at least one third of the members of the Supervisory 
board must be independent members; these individuals participate with 34.7% of the total 
number of members of the board (or a total of 34 people). In terms of the functioning of 
the Managing board, in ten banks this board is consisted of two members, as the legal 
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have special organizational risk management unit, while fourteen banks have special 
organizational unit for the control of concordance with the regulations (NBRM, 2012).
When taking into account the ownership structure of the banking system, the financial 
institutions have dominant share in the ownership structure of the banking system. The 
foreign investments have increased almost double in 2011. Thirteen out of seventeen banks
in Macedonia have dominant foreign ownership. Concentration of banking system, 
measured through Herfindahl-Hirschman index is relatively high in all segments of the 
banking operations. Despite the reduction of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, at the end of 
2011, there are still segments in which the concentration is above the acceptable upper 
limit. Highest concentration is observed in loans and deposits, while the concentration of 
the credits for companies is slightly above acceptable level. Only in total assets and 
deposits of enterprises, the concentration is within the acceptable level (NBRM, 2012).
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In 1919, the Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.(Du Plessis, 
Hargovan and Bagaric, 2011) ruled that a business exists for the profit of shareholders and 
the board of directors should focus on that objective (Ferrel, Fraedrich and Ferrel, 2013, p. 
41). Board serves as a bridge between shareholders and managers (Cadbury, 2002) playing 
a major governing role in the corporate governance framework. The study of corporate 
governance is complicated by the fact that the structure, role and impact of boards have 
been studied from a variety of theoretical and practical perspectives. Numerous studies are 
dedicated  on detection a link between corporate governance and bank performance 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hovey, Li and Naughton, 2003). There are also studies which 
analyzing the role of corporate boards, specifically its functions  and its composition, didn't 
found  clear evidence that corporate governance has impact on corporate performance 
(Denis & Denis, 1995; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). These studies also indicate that in 
cases where is observed a statistically significant relationship, there is no consistency 
across countries in the same direction (de Jong, Gispert, Kabir and Renneboog, 2002). By 
including the board of directors’ characteristics such as director’s shareholding, gender, 
director size, director’s race and directors’ independence, it brings the new avenue for the 
researcher and regulators of the importance of board of directors’ characteristics on the 
performance (Shukeri, Shin and Shaari, 2012). In this research qualitative and quantitative 
data has been used to penetrate an in-depth understanding on corporate governance and 
financial performance. Were used statistical and econometric models for obtain and 
processing information about respondents.
 Board Size
Board size is the most elaborated attribute in the literature, and in general the relationship 
between board size and performance is found to be inversely related. There are the 
statement which suggest that only an odd number of people can lead a corporation, and 
three are too many (Vance, 1983, p.33). Board size refers to the number of directors on the 
board. Today, numerous studies find that larger boards lead towards worse performance 
which is usually measured by Tobin’s q (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998; Mishra,
Randoy and Jenssen, 2001; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Mak & 
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Duta, 2012). Spencer Stuart Board Index (2008) reports that worldwide, board size has 
been shrinking over the years and that there is a continued trend towards smaller boards.
Contrary of these findings, large board size improves corporate performance through 
enhancing the ability of the company to establish external connection with the 
environment, providing on that way rare resources for company operations (Bacon, 1973;
Druckeriv, 2002; Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003;
Adams & Mehran, 2003; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004; Coles, Daniels and Naveen, 
2008; Belkhir, 2009; Arslan, Karan and Eksi, 2010; Chang & Duta, 2012). These studies 
found that board size have a positive impact on the stock market performance of company.
In fact, the greater the need for effective external linkage, the larger the board should be
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p.172). Finally, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) 
investigating 879 Finnish companies conclude that companies with smaller boards had 
higher ROA, arguing that the impact of board size may in part be contingent on the size 
and health of the company. Correspondingly, the following are the hypotheses that will be 
tested empirically with regard to the impact of the Board size:
H1a: The size of the Supervisory board is significantly and negatively related to bank
profitability measured by ROA.
H1b: The size of the Supervisory board is significantly and negatively related to bank
profitability measured by ROE.
H1c: The size of the Supervisory board is significantly and negatively related to bank
efficiency measured by CIRATIO.
H1d: The size of the Supervisory board is significantly and positively related to bank
capital requirement measured by CAR.
 Board Composition
Board composition is an important governance mechanism because the presence of non-
executive directors represents an effective tool of monitoring the actions of the executive 
directors and of providing that the they take policies which will enhance shareholders 
wealth (Fama, 1980; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985). Non-executive directors are independent 
from the company and from top managers. Board independence means the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors relative to the total number of directors (Chaghadari, 
2011). Empirical research present mixed results about relationship between company 
performance and board independence from different perspective (Kesner, 1987; 
Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990; Hermalin & Weishbach, 1991; Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; Pi & Timme, 1993; 
Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Beasley, 1996; 
Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein, 
1997; Weir, 1997; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; 
Klein, 1998; Millstein & Macavoy, 1998; Bhagat & Black, 1999; Weir & Laing, 1999; 
Liang & Li, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2000; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; 
Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe, 2001; Prevost, Rao and Hossain, 2002; Cho & Kim, 2003;
Weisbach & Hermalin, 2003; Dahya & McConnell, 2003; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004;
Peng, 2004; Davidson & Rowe, 2004; Harris & Raviv, 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Krivogorsky, 2006; Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006; Dahya & McConnell, 2007; Finegold, 
Benson and Hecht, 2007; Sanda, Garba and Mikailu, 2008; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; 
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and Wiberg, 2009; Nguyen & Nielsen, 2010; Arslan, Karan and Eksi, 2010; Chaghadari, 
2011; Shan & Xu, 2012; Sheikh & Wang, 2012; Htay, Aung, Rashid and Adnan 2012; 
Chen, 2012; Pokrashenko, 2012). Importantly, board with many independent directors 
show a high effectiveness and enhance company performance (Daily & Dalton, 1993).
Here from, the hypotheses to test the significance of the impact of Board composition are 
defined with the following statements:
H2a: The Supervisory board independence is significantly and positively related to bank’s 
profitability measured by ROA.
H2b: The Supervisory board independence is significantly and positively related to bank’s 
profitability measured by ROE.
H2c: The Supervisory board independence is significantly and positively related to bank’s 
efficiency measured by CIRATIO.
H2d: The Supervisory board independence is significantly and positively related to bank’s 
capital requirement measured by CAR.
Board diversity as an integral composition issue has recently caught the attention of 
scholars, managers, shareholders, and government (Johansen, 2008; Hagendorff & Keasey, 
2008; Suklev & Sukleva, 2012). Arguments for diversity in the boardroom are both 
economic and ethical (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Board diversity also generates
various costs associated with coordination problems and decision making times (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Further, board diversity may corrode cohesion and lead to a less 
cooperative and conflicts within group (Blau, 1977; Lau & Murnighan, 2005). This paper 
examines boards’ exhibit heterogeneity due to education (Ph.D holds), nationality and 
gender.
 CEO Qualities 
Power of CEO is determinated by the CEO tenure (Graefe-Anderson, 2009; Wulf, Stubner, 
Miksche and Roleder, 2010; Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda, 2011; Horstmeyer, 2011). The 
effect of a powerful CEO can be counterbalanced by other executives (Berger, Kick and 
Schaeck, 2012). Therefore, it is obvious that powerful CEO has a negative impact on bank 
performance. Consequently, the significance of the impact of CEO qualities will be tested 
though the following hypotheses:
H3a: The CEO Power is significantly and negatively related to bank’s profitability 
measured by ROA.
H3b: The CEO Power is significantly and negatively related to bank’s profitability 
measured by ROE.
H3c: The CEO Power is significantly and negatively related to bank’s efficiency measured 
by CIRATIO.
H3d: The CEO Power is significantly and positively related to to bank’s capital 
requirement measured by CAR.
Financial dependence of CEO (Suklev, 2011) also can be used as a discipline mechanism 
which ensure better performance for banks. To the extent that CEO and other board 
members own stakes of the company, they develop shareholder-like interests and are less 
likely to engage in behavior that is detrimental to shareholders (Fama, 1980; Demsetz & 
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2009; Arslan, Karan and Eksi, 2010). The CEO will then have the same objectives as the 
shareholder. In addition, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) reveal that if the percentage of 
the managers’ stakes moves from 0 to 5%, performance goes up from 5 to 25%. If the 
percentage exceeds 25%, performance improves but very slowly.
Figure 1: The framework for the relationship between the corporate governance and bank’s 
performance
Empirical Research
 The Model
In this section is investigated the relation between the corporate governance with the 
bank’s performance using OLS regressions. Four measures are used to observe bank 
performance: Return on Assets (ROA) calculated as profit after taxes divided by total 
assets of a bank; Return on Equity (ROE) calculated as profit after taxes divided by total 
equity of a bank; Cost-Income Ratio which is used as a quick test of efficiency which 
reflects the non-interest costs as proportion of net income; and Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) expressed as proportion of financial capital to the risk-weighted assets (see BCBS, 
2011). These four measures represent the dependent variables in the study. On the other 
hand, the board structure is described in three dimensions: board size, board composition, 
and CEO qualities. Note that the banking system in Macedonia exhibits a two-tier 
corporate governance composed of Supervisory (SB) and Managing board (MB). Since the 
responsibilities of the members in the Supervisory board are attributed greater importance 
for the bank’s corporate governance, the Supervisory board is given preference to study its 
composition and size. Hence, the majority of independent variables are derived from the 
data collected about the Supervisory board, while few of them relate to the Managing 
board. Nonetheless, since the CEO always acts as President of the Managing board and 
more importantly bears much of the responsibility for the bank’s performance, his qualities 
are given specific importance in the study and are analyzed within a separate dimension. 
Each of the independent variables is briefly explained in turn. The size of Supervisory 
Board (SBSIZE) and the size of Managing Board (MBSIZE) are both measured using a 
natural logarithm of the total number of members in each of them, which is aligned with 
the studies of Anderson and Reeb (2003); de Andres, Azofra, and Lopez (2005); and 
Jackling and Johl (2009). Board composition as a dimension of the board structure is 
represented with the following variables:  Supervisory Board Independence 
(SBINDEPEND) which reflects the number of non-executive members as proportion of 
total number of members in the board; Foreign members of Supervisory Board  Ratio 
(FSBRATIO) defined as proportion of members that haven’t  acquired Macedonian 
citizenship to the total number of board members; Women members of Supervisory 
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Board Ratio (WSBRATIO) which, similarly, is defined as proportion of the women 
members to the total number of members in the board; and Supervisory Board 
Educational Ratio expressing the proportion of members in the Supervisory board 
holding Ph.D.The third dimension described with the CEO qualities includes the following 
measures as dummy variables: dummy for CEO to distinguish whether the CEO is foreign 
citizen (given value 1) or not (given value 0); dummy for CEO Ownership which gets 
value 1 if the CEO owns bank’s shares and 0 if not; and dummy variable for the CEO 
Power expressed as the longevity of the CEO serving on this position (value 1 for more 
than a four-year term or value 0 for exactly one term). The other variables inputted in the 
study are not directly related to the board structure, and are, thus, grouped as control 
variables. These include: Bank’s age (AGE) calculated as a natural logarithm of the 
difference between the principle year of analysis and the year of bank’s foundation;
Credits/Deposits Ratio (CDRATIO) defined as proportion of bank’s total credits lent to 
its customers to the total deposits it keeps; and Bank’s nature (BANTURE) used as a 
dummy variable to denote whether the bank is a subsidiary of a multinational bank (given 
value 1) or not (given value 0). Description of all these variables is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Measures of Bank Performance (dependent variables)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Cost-Income Ratio (CIRATIO)
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
Profit after taxes/Total Assets
Profit after taxes/Total Equity
Non-interest costs/Net income
Financial capital/Risk-weighted Assets
Measures of Board Structure (independent variables)
Board size:
Size of Supervisory Board(SBSIZE)
Size of Managing Board (MBSIZE)
Board composition:
Supervisory Board Independence 
(SBINDEPEND)
Foreign members of Supervisory Board Ratio 
(FSBRATIO)
Women members of Supervisory Board Ratio 
(WSBRATIO)
Supervisory Board Educational Ratio 
(EDUSBRATIO)
CEO qualities:
Dummy for CEO (CEO)
Dummy for CEO Ownership (CEOOWN)
Dummy for CEO Power (CEOPOWER)
natural logarithm of the total number of members in the 
Supervisory board
natural logarithm of the total number of members in the 
Managing board
proportion of non-executive members in the Supervisory board
proportion of foreign members in the Supervisory board
proportion of women members in the Supervisory board
proportion of members in the Supervisory board holding Ph. D.
1: if the CEO is foreign citizen; 
0: if otherwise.
1: if the CEO owns bank’s shares;
0:if otherwise.
1: if the CEO serves longer than one-term (4 years);
0: if otherwise.
Control variables (independent variables)
Bank’s age (AGE)
Credits/Deposit Ratio (CDRATIO)
Dummy for Bank’s nature (BNATURE)
natural logarithm of the difference between the principle year of 
analysis and the year of bank’s foundation
Credits/Deposits
1: if a bank is subsidiary of a multinational bank;
0: if otherwise
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Because of the large number of independent variables used in the study, three multiple 
regression analyses with limited variables have been developed in order to assess the 
relationship. Each of the analysis uses a multiple regression model stated with the 
following equation:
Where:
i represents the cross-sectional dimension of the data;
represents the dependent variables in the model;
represent the independent variables;
represent the dummy variables;
denotes the slope coefficient;
and denote the coefficients of the independent and 
dummy variables respectively;
represents the error term.
Firstly, a specific model was developed to assess the relation between the size of the 
Supervisory and Managing board with the bank’s performance, which can be expressed 
with the following regression equation:
Next, another one was developed particularly to measure the relation between the board 
structure with the bank’s performance and is stated with:
The last of the models developed is to measure the relationship between the CEO qualities 
defined as dummy variables with the bank’s performance using the following equation:
Different methods are available to solve for the parameters in the given equation, but the 
most simple one is by using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), which is demonstrated in 
prior studies such as Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, (2007); Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2008); and Linck, Netter, Yang (2008). This method minimizes the sum of squared 
vertical distances between the observed responses in the dataset and the responses 
predicted by the linear approximation to estimate the unknown parameters in the regression 
model.
 Sample and Data
The sample used in the development of the model includes 15 out of 17 banks, thus 
representing 88% of its statistical population. The data collected for the study are extracted 
from several sources, including the official websites of the National Bank of the Republic 
of Macedonia (NBRM) and the Macedonian Securities Exchange Commission, the official 
sites of the banks in question, and the financial and proxy statements published by the 
banks at the end of the year. In this way, the numerical data to calculate the dependent 
variables and some of the control variables are derived from the financial statements, the 
data about the board size and composition are extracted from the official sites of the banks 
and the official site of NBRM, the information for the CEO qualities are predominantly 
based on the publications on the website of the Macedonian Securities Exchange 
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Commission, while the data for some variables such as the bank’s age and its ownership 
structure come from the proxy statements and some web pages on the banks’ official 
websites. The empirical data used as inputs in the study for the banks have been observed 
for the 2008-2011 period with a total number of 60 observations.
 Analysis and Findings
The findings yielded from the first regression model demonstrate that the size of both, the 
Supervisory and the Managing board is positively related to the bank’s profitability 
measured by ROA (see Appendix 1A). It means that any increase in the number of 
members in one of these boards is likely to result in increased bank’s profitability. This 
may be explained by the fact that the appointment of new members in each of the two 
boards will produce stronger decision-making process that may boost bank’s performance. 
In this way, the hypothesis stated as H1a is unsupported. With regard to the impact on the 
profitability measured by ROE, none of the variables in the model has significant relation 
as shown in Appendix 1B, which reflects a rejection of H1b. Furthermore, a significant and 
positive relationship exists between the size of the Managing board and the Cost-Income 
Ratio (see Appendix 1C), which implies that the Macedonian banks with larger Managing 
board will be able to improve bank’s efficiency better than those with smaller one. In 
relation to the capital requirement measured by the Capital Adequacy Ratio, the banks with 
smaller Managing board tend to hold a larger percentage of their liquidity assets against 
their risk-weighted assets as implied through the significant and negative relation in 
Appendix 1D. A reasonable explanation for this could be that the smaller Managing board 
cannot efficiently manage the risk of the bank’s capital, which subsequently leads towards 
increased risk aversion. No significance relationship has been demonstrated between the 
size of Supervisory board and CIRATIO and CAR respectively, which implies that the 
hypotheses H1c and H1d are rejected. The analysis also examines the impact of bank’s age 
as a control variable on each of the dependent variables and proves that there is a 
significant and positive relationship only to the capital requirement as shown in Appendix 
1D. That is, the Macedonian banks usually tend to increase the financial capital held for 
liquidity purposes over time. Importantly, the assessment of this model demonstrates no 
significance in the relation between bank’s age and its profitability, which means that the 
commonly used rationale that the old banks perform better results does not necessarily 
apply in the case with Macedonia.
From the assessment of the variables in the second model, it’s visible that there is a 
significant impact in negative direction of the board’s independence measured by the 
proportion of non-executive members seated in the Supervisory board to bank’s 
profitability measured by ROA and ROE (see Appendices 2A and 2B). Such conclusion 
strikes with numerous studies on this topic, including the agency theory, and leads the 
hypotheses H2a and H2b to be unsupported. However, the findings presented in Appendix 
2C show that there is a positive association of the proportion of non-executive members to 
the Cost-Income Ratio, implying that an increase of this proportion in the Supervisory 
board of Macedonian banks is likely to boost bank’s efficiency. This subsequently leads to 
acceptance of the hypothesis stated as H2c. The results shown in Appendix 2D also suggest 
the existence of a positive dependence of Supervisory board independence on the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio, meaning that the bank will usually prefer risk aversion and therefore hold 
more liquidity assets as result of the increase of outsiders within the board. The hypothesis
H2d is thus supported. The assessment of the regression model also yields results that prove 
the existence of a significant and negative relationship between the proportion of female 
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members of the Supervisory board and bank’s performance measured by ROA (see 
Appendix 2A), implying to the conclusion that the banks in Macedonia with a large 
proportion of women do not perform better results than the others. In addition, the findings 
in Appendix 2C reveal a statistically significant and strong positive association of the 
Women members Ratio to the Cost-Income Ratio, which suggests that the presence of 
female members in the Supervisory board may still be justified that they can bring 
competences to improve supervision that is likely to boost bank’s efficiency. No 
significant relationship has been demonstrated in the relationship between the Foreign 
members of Supervisory Board Ratio and Supervisory Board Educational Ratio as 
independent variables and the dependent variables.
When measuring the impact of the CEO qualities on bank’s performance, the results shown 
in Appendices 4A and 4B suggest a significance and positive association of the number of 
terms serving as CEO and bank’s profitability measured by ROA and ROE. It means that 
the banks in Macedonia managed by CEOs that hold this position for a longer period of 
one four-year term are more profitable than those with CEOs serving their first term as 
such. The hypotheses H3a and H3b are thus unsupported. Further in this analysis, there is a 
significant and negative impact of the length of term on bank’s efficiency measured by the 
Cost-Income Ratio and on the capital requirement measured by the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio as well. The first relationship proves the statement that the CEOs that serve their first 
term at this position are better in improving bank’s efficiency than those serving longer, 
while the latter one the statement that the CEOs with less history in the bank are more 
adverse towards the risk and therefore would manage to hold larger portion of their 
potential for lending. In this case, the hypothesis H3c is supported and hypothesis H3d
unsupported. It can be explained by the fact that the CEO needs time to learn all of the 
preferences and politics of the bank in order to improve his decision-making abilities 
towards bank’s risk management. In addition to these findings, the assessment of this 
model also reveals a significant and negative relationship between the nationality of CEO 
and the profitability measured by ROE as shown in Appendix 3B. In other words, the 
banks with foreign CEO do not necessarily perform better results in the return of the 
capital invested by their owners. The analysis also demonstrates that the Credits/Deposits 
Ratio has a significant and negative impact on the Capital Adequacy Ratio (see Appendix 
4), implying that a reduced Credits/Deposits Ratio is likely to trigger an increase in the 
portion of lending potential held by the bank. Logically, the reduced number of CDRATIO 
provoked by the reduced amount of money in form of credits to the customers results in 
increase of the liquidity assets and thereby CAR. For the impact of the ownership by the 
CEO and the status of a bank as a subsidiary or an independent financial institution, the 
probabilities in the analysis to each of the dependent variables show that there is no 
significance.
Despite of the findings and the methodology used in this study, the results and the 
comments can still be biased because of several limitations including: manipulation of 
financial statements, undervaluation of assets, use of manipulative policies to record 
depreciation, adoption of different methods to consolidate accounts and others (see 
Chakravarthy,1986). 
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